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ABSTRACT
The vulnerabilities which plague computers cause endless
grief to users. Slammer compromised millions of hosts in
minutes; a hit-list worm would take under a second. Re-
cently proposed techniques respond better than manual ap-
proaches, but require expensive instrumentation, limiting
deployment. Although spreading “antibodies” (e.g. signa-
tures) ameliorates this limitation, hosts dependant on anti-
bodies are defenseless until inoculation; to the fastest hit-list
worms this delay is crucial. Additionally, most recently pro-
posed techniques cannot provide recovery to provide contin-
uous service after an attack.
We propose a solution, called Sweeper, that provides both
fast and accurate post-attack analysis and eﬃcient recov-
ery with low normal execution overhead. Sweeper combines
several techniques. (1) Sweeper uses lightweight monitoring
techniques to detect a wide array of suspicious requests, pro-
viding a ﬁrst level of defense. (2) By leveraging lightweight
checkpointing, Sweeper postpones heavyweight monitoring
until absolutely necessary — after an attack is detected.
Sweeper rolls back and re-executes repeatedly to dynami-
cally apply heavy-weight analysis via dynamic binary instru-
mentation. Since only the execution involved in the attack
is analyzed, the analysis is eﬃcient, yet thorough. (3) Based
on the analysis results, Sweeper generates low-overhead an-
tibodies to prevent future attacks of the same vulnerability.
(4) Finally, Sweeper again re-executes to perform fast recov-
ery.
We implement Sweeper in a real system. Our experimen-
tals with three real-world servers and four real security vul-
nerabilities show that Sweeper detects an attack and gener-
ates antibodies in under 60 ms. We also show that Sweeper
imposes under 1% overhead during normal execution, clearly
suitable for widespread production deployment (especially
as Sweeper allows for partial deployment). Finally, we an-
alytically show that, for a hit-list worm otherwise capable
of infecting all vulnerable hosts in under a second, Sweeper
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1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Motivation
Modern society relies on computer software; unfortunately,
much software contains security vulnerabilities, with mem-
ory overwrite vulnerabilities (e.g., buﬀer overﬂows) account-
ing for over 60% [13]. These vulnerabilities allow self prop-
agating worms, such as Code Red [11], Blaster [10], and
SQL Slammer [12] to rapidly do billions of dollars of dam-
age [30]. Advanced worms demonstrate that manual patch-
ing is insuﬃcient–by the time an administrator reads an
alert about the worm, they are likely already infected [54].
Since worms attacks are clearly too fast for humans, an
automated response is imperative. Consider a hypothetical
ideal automatic worm defense with the following behavior.
If a worm attempts to infect it, the defense system detects
the attack. It then analyzes the attack attempt to ﬁnd the
underlying vulnerability. Without human assistance, it de-
vises a shareable “antibody” suitable for stopping all attack
attempts of this vulnerability (not just this particular ex-
ploit) with no false positives. After the analysis, the ma-
chine can recover to continue execution as if the worm had
not attacked. Finally, the overheads of running the defense
system are low enough to allow deployment on all hosts.
This ideal defense system leaves no room for worms; wher-
ever they go, they are detected, picked apart, and have the
underlying vulnerability they use sealed oﬀ. The only trace
of the worm’s existence is log messages and new antibodies.
Essentially, what we want is an Internet worm defense
system that satisﬁes three properties:
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(http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/1272996.1273010)• Fast and accurate attack detection/analysis: The de-
fense system needs to detect and analyze the attack
eﬃciently and accurately to prevent damage and fu-
ture attacks exploiting the same vulnerability.
• Low overhead for universal deployment: The defense
system has to have low overhead to enable practi-
cal production system deployment, especially in server
scenarios where performance is important.
• Eﬃcient recovery: It is also highly desirable for the
defense system to recover from an attack as eﬃciently
as possible to provide non-stop service, especially for
applications that demand high availability.
Unfortunately, none of the existing defense systems can
deliver the above three desired properties. First, although
some existing solutions such as PaX [2], StackGuard [17],
LibSafe [56], and ProPolice [22] add reasonably low over-
head (22%-0%) that they can potentially deploy universally,
they only detect some types of attacks, as shown by a prior
work [62]. Address space randomization [2, 23] detects many
memory-related vulnerabilities but provides too limited of
information about an exploit to analyze the attack and gen-
erate antibodies against future exploits. At best, the pro-
gram will halt at the vulnerable instruction, at worst the
attack will (with low probability) succeed. Similarly, stack
canaries tell us that the stack was overwritten, but not by
who. Tools like LibSafe only detect issues in the speciﬁc
library functions they target. We can deploy such systems,
but we will not learn much from them.
Second, most existing solutions that provide reasonably
accurate attack detection and analysis incur too much over-
head (up to 30-40X slowdowns [41]) to be practical to de-
ploy universally. Example of these tools include DIRA [51],
DACODA [18], Vigilante [16], or our own previous work,
TaintCheck [41]. The techniques which can best detect
and analyze an attack (e.g., TaintCheck or DACODA) im-
pose the highest overheads. To provide detailed analysis of
the exploit, they instrument most of the instructions, and
record many details about what happens. Due to high run-
time overheads, such tools must instead rely on a limited,
sentinel- or canary-like deployment. If an unlucky worm
happens to infect such a sentinel host, it will be caught, but
the bulk of hosts are unmonitored, open to attack.
A partial remedy proposed in Vigilante [16] is to, once
caught at a sentinel machine, analyze the attack and au-
tomatically generate antibodies, i.e., SCAs (Self-Certifying
Alerts), to quickly distribute to other hosts against infection.
Unfortunately fast hit-list worms can, if unimpeded, infect
every vulnerable host in milliseconds [53]; the time it takes
to generate, distribute, and verify an alert in a Vigilante-like
system is too long. In summary, none of these remedies com-
pletely address the fundamental limitation of most existing
solutions, i.e., fail to provide accurate and fast detection and
analysis of Internet attacks without incurring high normal
execution overhead.
In addition to the above limitation, a parallel shortcom-
ing of existing solutions is recovery: most fail to provide
eﬃcient recovery because they have to stop the service and
restart after an attack. For example, although TaintCheck
will identify the improper use of untrusted data and stop
execution, our original implementation of TaintCheck can-
not undo the bad eﬀects; any overrun buﬀers will remain
overrun. We merely stop the attack, delegating recovery
to restart. Unfortunately, restarting a system or an appli-
cation usually takes up to several seconds [58]. For servers
that buﬀer signiﬁcant amount of state in main memory (e.g.,
data buﬀer caches), it requires a long period to warm up to
full service capacity [7, 59].
In summary, to maximize the level of defense against se-
curity attacks, it is highly desirable to develop a solution
that can meet all three properties, namely fast and accurate
detection/analysis, low overhead for universal deployment
and eﬃcient recovery.
1.2 Contributions
To achieve the above goal, we propose a comprehensive
defensive solution called Sweeper
1 that, perhaps for the ﬁrst
time, is able to meet the three desired properties described
above by innovatively combining several new techniques.
First, by cleverly leveraging a lightweight checkpointing
and monitoring support, we postpone heavyweight moni-
toring until absolutely necessary — after being attacked. In
other words, during normal execution, the system takes only
lightweight checkpoints to allow re-execution and recovery
in case of an attack; and performs lightweight monitoring to
detect a wide range of suspicious requests that exploit both
unknown and known vulnerabilities (detecting the former
type is through address randomization and low-overhead
dynamic memory bug detection, and detecting the latter
is through our automatic, eﬃcient antibody generation dur-
ing our thorough on-line attack analysis). Both lightweight
checkpoint and lightweight monitoring impose very low over-
head, making it practical to be potentially deployed univer-
sally. In addition, Sweeper also supports partial deployment
(discussed in more details in Section 6). Sweeper’s private
data (checkpoints, analysis tools) are protected from cor-
ruption by Internet attacks.
After an attack is detected, Sweeper can “go back in
time” (i.e., rollback) and dynamically add heavy-weight in-
strumentation and analysis during replay to conduct com-
prehensive and thorough attack analysis including dynamic
memory bug detection, dynamic program slicing, memory
state analysis, dynamic taint analysis, as well as automat-
ically generating antibodies such as input signatures and
vulnerability-speciﬁc execution ﬁlters (VSEF) [38] (antibod-
ies are further discussed in Section 3). Doing such allows
sophisticated and detailed analysis to be performed only for
those recent messages and execution period that are relevant
to the occurred attack—server initialization and long runs
of harmless inputs and normal execution need not suﬀer ex-
pensive monitoring and information recording. This novel
use of checkpoint and rollback allows us to have both low
overhead and thorough analysis.
Second, we again leverage checkpoint/re-execution, this
time to achieve recovery: after an exploit attempt is detected
(and any necessary analysis is performed) we roll back, and
re-execute the program while dropping the attacker’s input.
This allows us to use not only input signatures, but VSEFs
as well; without recovery, VSEFs only transform a code-
execution vulnerability into a denial-of-service vulnerability.
We implement these ideas in a real system. Our func-
tioning prototype is implemented in Linux, building on a
modiﬁed version of our previous Rx framework [45].Sweeper
1Like a sweeper in soccer, Sweeper is intended to be fast,
tough, and add depth to the defenseuses address space randomization for lightweight detection,
backed by post-exploit analysis tools such as dynamic mem-
ory bug detection, dynamic taint analysis [41], and backward
slicing [61]. We use the PIN [35] dynamic instrumentation
tool to add these analysis tools on-demand. We also imple-
ment both input based ﬁltering and VSEFs for defense on
both hosts performing analysis and those hosts which choose
not to.
As this paper focuses on protecting vulnerable applica-
tions, our current design and implementation assumes that
the operating system is secure. This assumption is not fun-
damental because (1) our Sweeper should be able to detect
most attacks (known or unknown) before they aﬀect the
operating system. (2) If necessary, we can also push most
Sweeper’s system-level operations into the virtual machine
hypervisor in a way similar to Revirt [21].
We test Sweeper using 4 real exploits in 3 servers: Apache,
Squid, and CVS. The overhead during pre-attack execution
(normal execution) is under 1%, making Sweeper clearly
suitable for widespread production deployment. Antibodies
can be generated in under 60 ms. Finally, we present an-
alytical results showing that even when partially deployed,
Sweeper is capable of containing even fast hit-list worms.
To summarize, Sweeper has the following unique advantages
compared to previous solutions:
1. It imposes low overhead during normal exe-
cution. During normal execution, only lightweight
monitoring and lightweight checkpointing are active.
Lightweight monitoring techniques such as random-
ization [14, 23, 63] or lightweight dynamic bug detec-
tion [20, 44, 66] impose reasonable amount of over-
head (nearly zero for address space randomization),
feasible for production run deployment. In-memory
checkpointing, such as our previous Flashback and Rx
works [45, 52], also impose only marginal amounts
of overhead (e.g., 1-5%). As we demonstrate in our
experimental results (Section 5.1), the low overhead
makes widespread production run deployment feasible.
2. It performs comprehensive and thorough at-
tack analysis, and generates eﬀective antibod-
ies. Low overhead during normal execution is achieved
without sacriﬁcing the analysis power. When the light-
weight monitoring trips, we can roll back and re-execute
with heavyweight analysis. Sweeper then dynamically
uses binary instrumentation tools (e.g., PIN [35]) to
insert analysis such as dynamic taint analysis [41] or
backward slicing [61] after the fact. Therefore, we do
not pay for expensive analysis for requests which do
not need it, but only for those requests where it mat-
ters.
3. It allows fast recovery. Simply detecting that an
exploit has been attempted is insuﬃcient; we have
to restore the server to a safe state. Once an at-
tack is detected, we can use rollback/re-execution to
re-execute without the attacker’s input. Rollback re-
moves the corruption the attacker may have left, while
re-execution allows us to complete servicing concurrent
and further valid requests without restarting the pro-
gram, thus achieving fast recovery.
4. It provides partial deployment option to hosts
that demand even lower overhead. Although the
overheads involved are low, there may be hosts which
do not wish to deploy the analysis tools. We do not
leave such hosts completely defenseless. As we show in
Section 6, Sweeper also provides an eﬀective commu-
nity defense option which can protect most hosts even
in a hit-list worm attack when only a fraction deploy
the Sweeper analysis mechanisms.
2. ARCHITECTURE
2.1 Overview
The Sweeper system has four functions: 1) during nor-
mal execution, light-weight monitoring for detecting attacks
and light-weight checkpoint for potential rollback-and-re-
execution for attack analysis; 2) after an attack, analyz-
ing the exploit attempt via multiple iterations of rollback-
and-re-execution; 3) generating and deploying an antibody
against future exploits; and 4) recovery after an attack is
detected and analyzed.
Figure 1 shows the architecture of Sweeper. The above
four functions are provided by three modules: runtime, anal-
ysis and antibody. Section 3 describes the details of each
component; here we discuss their overall function and their
interactions.
Runtime module The run time module supports (1) light-
weight monitoring and checkpoint during normal execution,
(2) re-execution during attack analysis, and (3) recovery af-
ter attack is analyzed. During normal execution, the run-
time module employs low overhead monitoring techniques
such as address randomization and other techniques dis-
cussed in more details in Section 3 to detect suspicious re-
quest. Moreover, it also uses input signatures and VSEFs
generated by the analysis and antibody modules on past
attacks to ﬁlter out malicious requests and detect exploits
of previously known vulnerabilities. In addition to light-
weight monitoring, the run time module also takes periodic
light-weight, in memory checkpoint similar to our previous
work Rx [45] and FlashBack [52] to ensure rollback-and-re-
execution for analysis and recovery in case of attacks.
The checkpoints taken by the runtime module, as well as
Sweeper’s other private state, are isolated from the process
we are protecting. The checkpoints themselves are stored
inside the operating system as shadow processes; unless an
attacker compromises the operating system’s own memory
space (contrary to our assumptions described in Introduc-
tion), the checkpoints cannot be touched. Further, the anal-
ysis tools are applied after an attack is detected. They take
control of the execution path, and can disallow any access to
their internal state. After they are applied, no instructions
are executed without the instrumentation tool ﬁrst being
given the opportunity to monitor it. In this manner, an at-
tacker is prevented from subverting either the analysis tools
or the checkpoints.
After an attack is detected, the runtime module is also
responsible to provide rollback and re-execution support as
guided by the analysis module to perform various attack
analysis. To support re-execution from a previous check-
point, it needs to replay all of or a selected subset of incom-
ing network messages received since that checkpoint based
on the type of analysis performed. During the re-execution,
all side-eﬀects such as outgoing network messages are sand-
boxed and silently dropped.
Finally, after the attack is analyzed and an antibody isDynamic Taint VSEF Signature Input Filter Memory Bug VSEF
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Figure 1: Architecture diagram of Sweeper
generated, the runtime module rolls back and re-executes
again from a selected checkpoint to perform recovery for
providing continuous service. The continuing execution will
have the new antibody (input signatures and VSEFs) in
place to detect future exploits to the same vulnerability.
During recovery, the output commit problem and the ses-
sion consistency are handled in a way similar to our pre-
vious work, Rx [45]. We will brieﬂy discuss these issues in
Section 4, but more details can refer to our previous Rx
work [45].
Analysis module The thorough analysis is performed by
the analysis module to generate input ﬁlters and VSEFs.
The analysis module is activated only when absolutely nec-
essary — after an attack is detected by the light-weight mon-
itors in the runtime module. By using the checkpoint/rollback
capabilities of the runtime module, the analysis module can
inspect and re-inspect the execution as necessary, going back
to a point prior to the attacking requests being read in. Be-
cause the execution to be monitored represents only a short
amount of time, a few tens of hundreds of milliseconds de-
pending on the checkpoint interval, even expensive analysis
tools complete quickly. Performing heavy-weight analysis
only on the periods of execution where it is necessary greatly
improves the eﬃciency of analysis and also enables more
thorough and accurate analysis.
After rollback, the analysis module dynamically attach
various analysis tools that are implemented using dynamic
binary instrumentation. There are many possible analysis
techniques which could be applied; in our implementation
(see Section 3 for details) we perform a static analysis of the
memory state, dynamic memory bug detection similar to
Valgrind [37] and Purify [25], dynamic taint analysis similar
to our previous TaintCheck work [41], and dynamic back-
ward slicing [61]. The overheads of the dynamic techniques
range from 20x to 1000x (for backward slicing). Yet since
analysis is only performed when necessary and only on a
short execution period that is related to the occurring at-
tack, the total expense is small.
Antibody module The antibody module uses the analy-
sis results and derive antibodies to detect future exploits to
the same vulnerability. There are two types of antibodies
supported by Sweeper: input signature ﬁlters, and vulnera-
bility speciﬁc execution ﬁlters (VSEF) [38]. Given the input
responsible for the exploit, an input signature for ﬁltering
can be generated [27, 29, 40, 50]. Also, given the instruc-
tions involved in the exploit (especially for buﬀer overﬂows),
we can generate a VSEF. In the case of a memory bug (e.g.
len = 64 + strlen(user) + ...;
t = xcalloc(len, 1);
t
\0
t
\0
x x x x \0
buf
bufsize = strlen(user)*3 +1;
buf = xcalloc(bufsize,1);
return buf;
//Copy from buf to t
x x x x \0
t
x x x x \0
buf
strcat(t, rfc1738_escape_part(user));
Resulting Heap
Overflow!
Code
(1)
(2)
(3)
Figure 2: A buﬀer overﬂow in Squid (CVE-2002-
0068).
stack smashing), the VSEF consists of monitoring the in-
struction which cause the buﬀer overﬂow, or monitoring the
return address of the susceptible function. Since these only
involve a handful of instructions, these VSEFs are inexpen-
sive. Together, these antibodies are suﬃcient to prevent
future exploit attempts from succeeding. Also, they can be
distributed to other hosts. If the other hosts are untrusting,
it is suﬃcient to give them the exploit-containing input; they
can then generate their own signatures and VSEFs.
Together, these modules make up the complete Sweeper
system. Deploying all of them together is the assumed de-
fault case. Ideally, all hosts would use all of the modules;
it is possible, and still beneﬁcial, to run only a partial set.
This is further discussed in the Section 6.
2.2 Process
To clarify how the system works, we present a concrete
walk-though of a real vulnerability. Figure 2 shows an ex-
ploitable buﬀer overﬂow bug in Squid. In step (1), heap
buﬀer t is allocated as 64 + strlen(user) bytes long. In
step (2), the function rfc1738 escape part(...) allocates
a buﬀer buf to be strlen(user) * 3 + 1 bytes long, and
then ﬁlls it in with an escaped version of the string user.
In step (3), buf is copied into t using strcat(...); since
strcat(...) is not bounds checked, t can overﬂow. The
bug is triggered whenever there are many characters that
are escaped in the user string.
Figure 3 illustrates the Sweeper defense process. Dur-attack attack attack
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Figure 3: Sweeper defense process.
ing normal operations, Sweeper takes periodic checkpoints.
At an attack, the light-weight sensors and monitors detect
that something is amiss—for example, a randomized mem-
ory layout has caused a segmentation fault to occur. So,
Sweeper begins its attack analysis. The execution is rolled
back to the previous checkpoint, and heavier weight anal-
ysis techniques are performed. In our current implemen-
tation, the ﬁrst analysis is an examination of the memory
state (i.e., analyze the core dump). This is a very fast step,
and it generates a good-quality VSEF. In the Squid vulner-
ability, this tells us that the segmentation fault occurred at
instruction 0x4f0f0907 in strcat. For this example, this is
enough to build an initial VSEF: check for out-of-bounds
accesses at that particular instruction. Actually, a small re-
ﬁnement is necessary, since strcat is a library function: the
return address at that time must also match (0x0804ee82,
or ftpBuildTitleUrl). Although later analysis steps can
be used to detect with more certainty, this VSEF is more
eﬀective than the generic sensors and it is available within
only 40ms of the ﬁrst sign of trouble.
Next, memory bug detection is performed. This is more
expensive, but it generates improved VSEFs, so we do it sec-
ond. The analysis includes bounds checking, stack-smashing
detection, double free detection, and dangling pointer detec-
tion. Monitoring all memory accesses is impractical for nor-
mal execution, but since Sweeper can dynamically add in-
strumentation to a replay from a checkpoint, the overhead is
manageable. In our Squid example, the heap is inconsistent,
and memory bug detection points out instruction 0x4f0f0907
in strcat as the source. This conﬁrms the earlier results,
and takes around 37 seconds.
The next step is dynamic taint analysis [41]. This allows
us to isolate the input for a signature. Dynamic taint anal-
ysis traces the inﬂuence of “untrusted” data (e.g. network
inputs) through the program, looking for “illegal” uses of
tainted data, such as a branch target. Once an illegal use
of tainted data is detected, we can trace the taint back to
the particular request responsible. The identiﬁed request
can then be passed on to a signature generator to generate
input signatures to ﬁlter out further attacks [27, 29, 40, 50].
The identiﬁcation of the original input responsible for the
attack also allows us to do fast recovery: we simply rollback
the process and re-execute without the malicious input, and
thus bring the process back to a safe state.
The last analysis step is dynamic slicing. The slicing col-
lects the full dependency graph, including data and control
ﬂow dependencies, of the instructions executed since the
checkpoint. Having the complete set of involved instruc-
tions and data allow us to verify the results of the previous
results: if they identify an issue which is not in the slice,
then they are incorrect. The graph is only for execution
on the malicious input, since the checkpoint. Running full
slicing from the very beginning of execution, even in replay,
is impractical. Depending on the program, slicing imposes
from 100x to 1000x overhead. Only by dynamically inserting
the graph collection from a checkpoint the slicing overhead
becomes acceptable and practical for automatic defenses.
In the Squid example, within around 107 seconds, Sweeper
generates a backward slice which exactly shows the reason
of the vulnerability: t is allocated too small, and there is no
bounds check. Further, none of the other tools report any-
thing outside of the backward slice; if they did, we would
suspect that the other tools were incorrect. Backward slicing
can then act as a sanity check against the other tools.
In this particular example, everything points to the same
instruction, 0x4f0f0907 in strcat. The later, more thorough
analysis steps serve as a conﬁrmation of the previous steps;
here they all fully agree. Consider instead a stack-smashing
attack: the crash may occur well after the buﬀer overﬂow.
Although it is possible to detect from a core dump, and we
can create a VSEF (use stack canaries or a separate return-
address stack for the eﬀected function), it would be prefer-
able to target the buﬀer overﬂow itself. This, however, is not
possible until after memory bug analysis is performed. Also,
generating a worm signature requires identifying the speciﬁc
input responsible; again, this is not possible with the simple
core analysis. In combining multiple analysis techniques, we
get something better than any one; fast but potentially weak
results from static analysis can augment slow but thorough
results from dynamic analysis.
3. DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION
As discussed in Section 2, Sweeper has three components,
one for runtime support, one for post-attack exploit anal-
ysis, and one for dealing with antibodies. Here we further
describe the details of each individual components.
3.1 Runtime Support
During normal execution, Sweeper needs to: 1) monitor
against generic attacks, 2) monitor network ﬂows and exe-
cution against speciﬁc attacks, and 3) take checkpoints suf-
ﬁcient to replay execution for later analysis and recovery.
Since these three tasks are being performed continuously,
they are performance critical: the higher the overhead im-
posed, the fewer sites will be willing to sacriﬁce the perfor-
mance for protection.
Runtime Monitoring Monitoring against generic attacks
can be performed with any lightweight bug detector. In
our current prototype implementation, we rely on address
space randomization [2, 5, 6, 14, 23, 24, 63], although there
are many other mechanisms which could be used [2, 15, 17,
24], including some of our own previous work such as Safe-
Mem [44], LIFT [43]. The advantage of automated diversity
mechanisms like address space randomization, which placesthe starting point of the stack and heap at a random ini-
tial oﬀset and randomizes library entry points, is that they
detect many attacks with high probability while imposing
minimal performance overhead in processing non-attack re-
quests.
Monitoring for speciﬁc attacks has two parts: input mon-
itoring and execution monitoring, based on the antibodies
automatically generated by Sweeper’s antibody module from
past attacks. Monitoring inputs for attack signatures is al-
ready widely deployed in network IDS systems. We combine
such monitoring with the input logging which is required to
support replay; it would be possible to separate the moni-
toring to a separate machine (e.g. a ﬁrewall) if desired. Ex-
ecution monitoring must occur on the machine in question.
We implement execution monitoring by adding dynamic bi-
nary instrumentation with PIN [35]. PIN allows the eﬃcient
addition of instrumentation to an already running process.
However, any instrumentation tool which allows dynami-
cally attaching to a running process would be feasible (e.g.
dynInst [1]); we choose PIN due to familiarity and eﬃciency.
Since only a minute portion of the execution needs to be
monitored (generally only the instruction which causes a
buﬀer overﬂow), PIN instrumentation for such monitoring
is of negligible overhead; only a handful of extra instructions
are inserted, and only in that one location.
Checkpointing Another task performed during normal ex-
ecution is checkpointing. We modify the Rx [45] checkpoint
and rollback system. Checkpoints are taken using a fork()-
like operation, which copies all process state (e.g. regis-
ters and ﬁle descriptors) and uses copy-on-write to duplicate
modiﬁed memory pages. The use of in memory checkpoints
is feasible since we keep them for a short time (a few min-
utes at most) and then discard them. The advantage is
much lower overhead than present in systems which write
checkpoints to disk.
Similar to Rx [45], a checkpoint is captured using a shadow
process. This provides a unique advantage for security pur-
pose because a shadow process has a separate address space
from the monitored process and is entirely invisible at user
level, even though some of their virtual pages may point
to the same physical pages due to copy-on-write. Since
we assume that the operating system is secure, an attack
that corrupts the monitored process is unlikely to aﬀect any
checkpoint state because the ﬁrst update to any page in the
monitored process after a checkpoint will trigger the oper-
ating system’s copy-on-write engine to copy the old page
to a diﬀerent location to ensure that the shadow process’s
memory state is not aﬀected.
Rollback is also straightforward: reinstate the stored state
back to the process. This is nearly instantaneous as it
is almost identical to a context switch. File state can be
handled similarly to previous work [34, 52] by keeping a
copy of accessed ﬁles and ﬁle pointers at the beginning of a
checkpoint interval. Network state is logged by a separate
proxy process; this proxy facilitates replaying messages for
re-execution and can also implement signature-based input
ﬁltering. The re-execution runs faster than the original, due
to lower IO costs (that is, there are no network delays or
disk cache misses). More details can be found in the Rx
paper [45].
Recovery As mentioned, the identiﬁcation of the original
input responsible for the attack also allows us to do fast re-
covery: we simply rollback the process and re-execute with-
out the malicious input, and thus bring the process back
to a safe state. In our system, rollback is accomplished by
reverting to a previously saved system checkpoint. We then
restart the system and replay legitimate (non-malicious) re-
quests received after the checkpoint. We further discuss is-
sues related to recovery of stateful services in Section 4.
3.2 Exploit Analysis
After the lightweight monitors have triggered, Sweeper
performs a more thorough analysis of the attack. We use a
variety of static and dynamic analysis tools, including static
core dump analysis, memory bug detection, dynamic taint
tracking, and dynamic backward slicing.
Core dump analysis By looking at the state of the pro-
gram at the time when the lightweight monitor detects an
attack, we can learn some things about the attack. This tool
checks the consistency of the heap data structures, walks the
stack to check for consistency, and determines the faulting
instruction. This step is very fast (a few milliseconds), and
can provide an initial VSEF. The disadvantage is that, given
only a static glimpse of the program, we cannot achieve
highly precise results. It is possible that an exploit may
trigger the monitors and leave memory in a seemingly con-
sistent state. Hence, we must still use more powerful tools
later. For straightforward attacks (e.g. a stack buﬀer over-
ﬂow ) this step is suﬃcient to create a VSEF targeting the
exact buﬀer overﬂow. If the attack is a stack-smashing at-
tack, and it is detected at the time of the ret instruction,
a VSEF to add stack canaries to that function can be gen-
erated. Although a more precise VSEF would be desired
(target the overﬂow directly), this initial analysis is avail-
able almost immediately. Furthermore, anything detected
in this stage, useful for a VSEF or not, is a potential start-
ing point for dynamic backward slicing.
Memory bug detection Memory bug detection is a im-
portant step for vulnerability analysis because memory bugs,
such as heap overﬂows or stack smashing, are commonly ex-
ploited for security attacks [23]. Detecting the misbehaving
memory instruction usually gives an important clue to ﬁnd
the exploited instruction. Furthermore, detecting a memory
bug gives a straightforward VSEF: insert the checks neces-
sary to catch that particular bug.
There are many existing powerful memory bug detection
tools commonly used by experienced programmers during
debugging. They are usually not used in production runs
due to the huge overhead (up to 100X slowdowns [66]). For-
tunately, in Sweeper, such tools are dynamically plugged in
during replay after an attack is detected, when overhead
is less of a concern and can also be minimized due to the
focused monitoring period. Operationally, we dynamically
attach the memory bug detectors during sandboxed replay.
In the short period of replay from the previous checkpoint,
memory operations are monitored and many types of mem-
ory bugs throughout this period can be caught.
Speciﬁcally, Sweeper detects three important types of mem-
ory bugs, all of which are serious security vulnerabilities.
The ﬁrst is stack smashing. The memory bug detector records
the stack return address location at every function entry and
monitors this location for writes. Pre-existing stack frames
are inferred from the stack frame base pointer register (ebp).
The second memory misbehavior we detect is heap over-ﬂow. Sweeper uses a modiﬁed red-zone technique which is
simple and reasonably eﬃcient—use malloc()’s own inline
data structures. We monitor these areas for invalid access
(e.g., not by malloc() or free()). Buﬀers allocated prior to
the checkpoint are inferred from the memory image at the
checkpoint. This technique has the advantage, over many
existing techniques, that it can begin mid-execution. For
the third type of memory bug—double free, all malloc()
and free() calls are monitored to catch any free() calls to
a previously freed location.
With the above described memory bug detection, Sweeper
can generate eﬃcient and accurate vulnerability monitor
predicates, and use them to guard the application from fu-
ture exploits. Speciﬁcally, bounds checking inserted at the
eﬀected instruction(s), or monitoring for double-frees at that
particular free, can catch future exploit attempts. This mon-
itoring is much more eﬃcient than full memory bug detec-
tion, since it only involves a few code locations.
Dynamic Taint Analysis As we demonstrated in our pre-
vious work [41], dynamic taint analysis is a powerful means
of detecting a wide range of exploits, including buﬀer over-
run, format string, and double free attacks, some of which
may be missed by the aforementioned memory bug detec-
tion. For Sweeper, we have reimplemented TaintCheck using
PIN, so that it can be inserted after an exploit is detected.
TaintCheck tracks the ﬂow of “taint” throughout a pro-
gram: data read from untrusted sources are tainted, and the
taint is maintained through data movement and arithmetic
operations. Further, TaintCheck veriﬁes that tainted data
is not used in a sensitive manner, e.g. as a return address or
as a function pointer. If tainted data is used in such a way,
we can trace back to the responsible input, identifying the
instructions that passed it along the way. For more details,
please see [41].
Dynamic Backward Slicing A backward program slice
is the set of instructions which eﬀected the execution of a
particular instruction [61]. That is, for a speciﬁc instruc-
tion, the backward slice is the set of dynamic instructions
which were necessary for the instruction to execute. Instruc-
tions not in the slice are therefore irrelevant: if they were
skipped, the execution of the selected instruction would not
be inﬂuenced. This is similar to dynamic taint tracking,
however all inﬂuences, including control ﬂow and pointer
indirection, are tracked. Consider the following code:
j=read(taint);
if(w==0)
x=y[i];
else
x=y[j];
z=x;
Suppose w were 3. In a backward slice from z=x, we would
ﬁnd a dependence on x=y[j], if(w==0), and j=read(taint).
We would also ﬁnd a dependence on whichever instructions
assigned to y[j] and w last. Dynamic taint analysis would
not notice the dependence on j or w, and hence not identify
that z is tainted.
We implement dynamic backward slicing in a way simi-
lar to [65]. We track the last dynamic instruction to write
to each register and memory location, as well as the last
to modify the control ﬂags. The PC depends on the last
conditional or indirect jump. Instructions, in turn, depend
on any registers they read, any memory they read, and the
PC. We construct a dependency tree from these relations;
generating a backward slice from this tree is as simple as
walking backward from the selected instruction.
Dynamic backward slicing gives similar (but more thor-
ough) results as dynamic taint analysis, however it is much
much more expensive: our implementation imposes 100x to
1000x overhead. Only because this analysis is performed
only when necessary is it at all practical. This again shows
the beneﬁts of deferring analysis until after an attack is de-
tected.
It is also possible to compute a forward slice: the set of all
instructions inﬂuenced by a starting instruction. A forward
slice from the exploit input would reveal all instructions and
memory potentially tainted by it. The dependence tree we
generate can compute such a slice; currently we do not do
so.
3.3 Antibodies
Sweeper’s antibodies provide protection against further
attacks. They can either be input signatures, or vulnerabil-
ity speciﬁc execution ﬁlters (VSEFs).
Input Signatures Input ﬁlters are commonly used to elim-
inate known exploits before they reach vulnerable servers [27,
29, 41, 40, 50]. Based on the input which caused the exploit
(derivable from either dynamic taint analysis or backward
slicing), many existing techniques can be used to generate
ﬁlters. Since Sweeper has VSEFs to provide a safety net, we
can start by generating signatures as exact matches. This
has the beneﬁt of very low false positives, and being imper-
vious to malicious training [39]. Polymorphic signatures are
also feasible; see our work [9] for details.
VSEFs Vulnerability speciﬁc execution ﬁlters, or VSEFs [38],
provide a low false-negative approach to detecting attacks.
VSEFs in Sweeper function like the heavyweight dynamic
analysis tools, except that they only monitor the instruc-
tions necessary to detect the exploit. Since the number of
instructions monitored is much smaller, they are no longer
heavy-weight but are light-weight. VSEF-hardened binaries
are able to reliably detect various attacks against the same
vulnerability, even in the face of poly- and meta-morphism.
Since they look for the same behavior as the heavyweight
dynamic analysis, they have similar false negative and false
positive properties. Sweeper considers VSEFs derived both
from memory bug detectors and from dynamic taint analy-
sis.
Memory-bug derived VSEFs consist of the instruction re-
sponsible for the memory bug, and the type of the bug. For
a buﬀer overﬂow, this is the store instruction which over-
ﬂows the buﬀer. For a double-free, this is the call to free()
which is redundant. In both cases, the implementation of
the VSEF is to monitor for the type of bug at that location:
is the write within bounds, or is the buﬀer to be freed already
free? In the case of stack overﬂows, this may be relaxed to
simply ensure that a return address is not being overwrit-
ten, if information about the stack layout is not available.
The static memory analysis may generate another sort of
memory VSEF: monitor the return address of one particu-
lar function. The call who’s return address is overwritten
is recorded in the usual place, and also copied separately.
Just prior to the ret call which pops the return address, the
stored value is compared to the stack’s value. This is simpler
than using canaries because the structure of the stack canremain the same. All of these memory bug derived VSEFs
only insert a handful of instrumentation instructions, and
therefore impose negligible overhead.
Dynamic taint analysis VSEFs consist of a list of instruc-
tions which propagated the taint, and the instruction which
incorrectly consumed tainted data. Ordinary dynamic taint
analysis instrumentation is applied for those instructions
only. Again, this imposes much less overhead than full
analysis. For more details, please refer to our paper on
VSEFs [38].
Distribution The generated anti-bodies can be dissemi-
nated to other hosts to protect them against further attacks.
The concrete manifestation of an antibody to be dissem-
inated is a set of VSEFs and an exploit-triggering input.
Together, these allow hosts to protect themselves in multi-
ple ways. Including the exploit-triggering input allows hosts
to verify the antibodies: in a sandbox, feed the input to the
vulnerable program while performing heavy-weight analysis.
Since receiving and applying VSEFs is a time-critical op-
eration, hosts may want to apply them without verifying
them ﬁrst. By deferring veriﬁcation, hosts reduce their ex-
posure to infection. A VSEF is a set of instruction addresses
which need to have certain monitoring (e.g. buﬀer over-
ﬂow monitoring, dynamic taint analysis, etc.). By their na-
ture, then, VSEFs cannot be harmful; incorrect or malicious
VSEFs will result in unnecessary bounds checking or taint
tracking, but cannot create behaviors that full monitoring
would not. At worst they cause a performance degrada-
tion. Unneeded VSEFs can be removed when they are veri-
ﬁed. Since veriﬁcation is deferred, we distributed antibodies
piecemeal. As each step completes, a host will distribute
results as it generates them. Similarly, hosts consuming an-
tibodies apply them as they receive them, deferring veriﬁca-
tion until after the exploit input is isolated.
4. ISSUES AND DISCUSSION
4.1 Recovery and Re-Execution
The Rx-based re-execution allows recovery in many prac-
tical cases. However, there may be instances where drop-
ping the attacking requests and re-executing is not suﬃcient
to maintain consistency. Consider, for example, an SSL-
enabled web server. Session keys depend on random num-
bers; for connections concurrent to the attack these num-
bers may turn out diﬀerent on re-execution. An alternative
to Rx is to use a Flashback [52] based checkpointing sys-
tem. Flashback logs all of the system calls made by the
process, in order to allow deterministic re-execution. For
Sweeper, this allows us to either re-execute the application
with more consistency or, failing that, to detect the incon-
sistency and abort. If the execution depends on a system
call returning the same result (e.g. a read() to a ﬁle, or
a call to gettimeofday()), Flashback will replay the same
result as previous executions. Therefore, diﬀerences in the
results of system calls will not perturb the execution. To
verify the consistency of results, Sweeper can compare the
re-execution’s calls to write() to the previous results Flash-
back recorded; if they match, we know that we have been
successful. In the case that the lack of the attack has caused
a change in program state (e.g., a counter of the number
of connections accepted) which changes the output, we can
abort the re-execution and resort to restart. It is our prac-
tical experience with Rx that this is a rare case, however,
for those instances where the execution is sensitive to small
changes, this alternative exists.
A further issue would be the reliance on other, non-checkpointed
programs, or the possibility that the operating system itself
becomes compromised prior to the lightweight monitoring
tripping. In both cases we would be unable to apply a cor-
rect rollback and re-execution. To prevent this, we could
apply the same checkpointing techniques to the whole OS
through a virtual machine (e.g. as done in Time Traveling
Virtual Machines [28]). This allows rollback of an entire
software stack, including the OS, any helper applications,
and even disk state. Although we feel that the OS is un-
likely to be corrupted prior to the lightweight monitoring
registering an attack, we can certainly feel safe that the VM
hypervisor will not become corrupted by a network-based
attack on one of its guests.
4.2 Sampling to Catch More Attacks
In order to deal with a broader range of attacks, Sweeper
can use more expensive monitoring to analyze a fraction of
requests. Although many security attacks involve memory
corruption attacks that can be noticed by lightweight bug
detectors, those that are not can be caught through sam-
pling and analysis with heavy-weight detection mechanisms.
Since the instrumentation is dynamic, the decision to more
thoroughly analyze a message can be made at runtime. It
would even be feasible for hosts to use heavier-weight detec-
tion when they are idle, and shift to address space random-
ization as they become fully loaded.
4.3 Effects of Limited Deployment
Although Sweeper has very low overhead, widespread de-
ployment does not necessarily mean 100%; it is unlikely to
reach such high levels. Sweeper does not require universal
deployment to function. Hosts may choose to act as con-
sumers of antibodies; the lightweight monitoring will still
make them more diﬃcult to exploit. There will be, how-
ever, a chance that such hosts will become infected, since
multiple infection attempts are likely to be made before an
antibody is available. If deployment rates are too low, the
worm is too fast, and the antibodies are too slow to be de-
livered, Sweeper will be unable to contain the worm. Com-
pared to previous systems, however, failure comes in more
extreme conditions. Section 6 discusses in much greater de-
tail the performance of Sweeper as a whole under varying
conditions.
5. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
5.1 Experiment Setup
Implementation We implemented Sweeper in Linux by
modifying the linux kernel 2.4.22 to support lightweight check-
point and rollback-and-replay. The various monitoring and
analysis techniques are implemented using the PIN binary
instrumentation tool [35]. All of the tools are integrated
together except for taint analysis; it is implemented stand
alone and we are in the processes of integration. Hence we
provide functionality results but not performance numbers
for taint analysis. In lieu of taint analysis performance, we
measure the time to isolate the exploit input by sending the
potentially suspicious requests one at a time. Both provideName Program Description CVE ID [57] Bug Type Security Threat Description
Apache1 Apache-1.3.27 CVE-2003-0542 Stack Local exploitable vulnerability enables
web server Smashing unauthorized access
Apache2 Apache-1.3.12 CVE-2003-1054 NULL Remotely exploitable vulnerability
web server Pointer allows disruption of service
CVS cvs-1.11.4 CVE-2003-0015 Double Remotely exploitable vulnerability provides
version control server Free unauthorized access and disruption of service
Squid squid-2.3 CVE-2002-0068 Heap Buﬀer Remotely exploitable vulnerability provides
proxy cache server Overﬂow unauthorized access and disruption of service
Table 1: List of tested exploits
the exploit input as a result, but we expect taint analysis
to be faster, based on our experience with Valgrind-based
TaintCheck.
Experiment Environment and Parameters Our ex-
periments are conducted on single-processor machines with a
2.4GHz Pentium 4 processor. By default, Sweeper keeps the
20 most recent checkpoints, and checkpoints every 200ms.
Evaluation Applications We evaluate Sweeper on four
real vulnerabilities in three server applications, as shown
in Table 1. All of the vulnerabilities are recorded by US-
CERT/NIST [57].
Experimental Design In our experiments, we evaluate
the functionality of Sweeper, as well as the eﬃciency of ex-
ploit and vulnerability analysis. We also show the normal
overhead of checkpointing for various checkpoint intervals.
5.2 Functionality Evaluation
Table 2 presents a summary of Sweeper’s functionality
results for four exploits. The second column summarizes
the results: for all four exploits, Sweeper detects the attack,
generates a VSEF, and identiﬁes the original input which
triggered the fault.
The detailed results columns show what each of the anal-
ysis steps determines. The ﬁrst step, memory state anal-
ysis, looks at the stack, heap, and instruction pointer at
the time the lightweight monitoring trips. For all four vul-
nerabilities, this results in a VSEF; for the Apache2 and
Squid bugs this VSEF ends up being the ﬁnal “best” VSEF.
The second step, memory bug detection, identiﬁes various
memory bugs through dynamic instrumentation. For the
Apache1 and CVS exploits this step provides a more speciﬁc
VSEF. Consider speciﬁcally the Apache1 VSEFs. The ini-
tial VSEF only protects the return address. For this exploit,
this is suﬃcient. However, the speciﬁc buﬀer overﬂow may
also be exploitable by overwriting a stack function pointer
2;
the initial VSEF won’t catch this. The improved VSEF
identiﬁes more exactly the underlying software ﬂaw the re-
sulted in the vulnerability: “stack buﬀer overﬂow”. The
initial VSEF captures a subset vulnerability: “overwrite re-
turn address”. However, the initial VSEF will still catch all
instances of this exploit, and all exploits that use the speciﬁc
sub-vulnerability; hence it will still stop the worm outbreak.
The third step is input/taint analysis—the purpose is to
identify the input responsible so that it can be fed to a
signature generator. This is done successfully for all four
vulnerabilities. For the Apache1 bug, however, the input is
2To the best of our knowledge, this particular buﬀer overﬂow
does not have such multiple methods of exploitation.
conﬁguration speciﬁc. This makes it diﬃcult to share the
result with other hosts, but also diﬃcult to exploit. Finally,
dynamic slicing is performed. It serves as a sanity check on
the other stages; if a previous stage claims an instruction
or data value is involved in the attack and dynamic slicing
disagrees, then the previous step is incorrect. In all four
cases, however, dynamic slicing is consistent with the other
analysis steps.
These results demonstrate that Sweeper is capable of de-
fending against a variety of vulnerabilities: a stack overﬂow,
a null pointer dereference, a double free, and a heap buﬀer
overﬂow. In all four cases, Sweeper generates a VSEF and
identiﬁes the exploit input.
5.3 Performance Evaluation
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Figure 4: Performance at varying checkpoint inter-
vals for Squid
Checkpointing Since Sweeper is intended for widespread
deployment, overhead is an important concern. As demon-
strated by Figure 4, the performance overhead of check-
pointing and network logging is low; at a 200ms checkpoint
interval, Sweeper only degrades performance by .925% —
throughput drops from 93.45 Mbps to 92.59Mbps. The
fastest checkpoint interval, 30 ms, only shows a 5% per-
formance degradation. These results clearly demonstrate
that the checkpoint overhead is nominal, and suitable for
production run deployment. More detailed discussion of the
performance of checkpointing can be found in our previous
Rx paper [45].
Vulnerability Monitoring Sweeper’s VSEFs only check
a small subset of instructions; hence they have good perfor-
mance properties. It is not necessary to bounds check the en-
tire program, but only the one vulnerable callsite. For Squid,
the VSEF checks for a heap buﬀer overﬂow at 0x4f0f0907 (inApp. Defense Detailed Processes and Results
Result Summary Step Technique Main Results From Each Step
Apache1
Correct buggy instruction #1 Memory State Crash at 0x805e33f (try alias list); stack inconsistent
and memory location Analysis VSEF: use a side stack for (try alias list)
#2 Memory Bug Stack smashing by 0x808c3ee (lmatcher)
Correct VSEFs Detection VSEF: 0x808c3ee should not overﬂow stack buﬀer
#3 Input/Taint Analysis GET.../trigger/crash.html...
Conﬁguration-speciﬁc input #4 Slicing Veriﬁes results
Apache2
NULL pointer dereference #1 Memory State Crash at 0x8060029 (is ip); accessing NULL pointer
correctly identiﬁed Analysis VSEF: check for NULL pointer
#2 Memory Bug No memory bug detected, just
Correct VSEFs Detection a NULL pointer dereference
#3 Input/Taint Analysis * Referer: (ftp://|http://){0}? *
Finds input #4 Slicing Veriﬁes results
CVS
Correct buggy instruction #1 Memory State Crash at 0x4f0eaaa0 (lib. free); heap inconsistent
and memory location Analysis VSEF: Check for double frees
#2 Memory Bug Double free by 0x808d7ac (dirswitch)
Correct VSEFs Detection VSEF: 0x808d7ac should not double-free
#3 Input/Taint Analysis [CVS request stream]
Finds input #4 Slicing Veriﬁes results
Squid
Correct buggy instruction
#1
Memory State Crash at 0x4f0f0907 (lib. strcat); heap inconsistent
and memory location Analysis VSEF: Heap bounds-check 0x4f0f0907 (in lib. strcat)
when called by 0x804ee82 (ftpBuildTitleUrl)
#2 Memory Bug Heap buﬀer overﬂow at 0x4f0f0907 (lib. strcat)
Correct VSEFs Detection VSEF: Veriﬁed above
#3 Input/Taint Analysis ftp://\\...\\@ftp.site
Finds input #4 Slicing Veriﬁes results
Table 2: Overall Sweeper results
Time to Time to Initial Total Component Diagnosis Time
Application First Best Analysis Analysis Memory State Memory Bug Input/Taint Dynamic
VSEF VSEF Time Time Analysis Detection Analysis Slicing
Apache1 60 ms 14 sec 24 sec 68 sec 0.06 sec 14 sec 9 sec 45 sec
Squid 40 ms 40 ms 38 sec 145 sec 0.04 sec 30 sec 7 sec 108 sec
Table 3: Sweeper failure analysis time. The component diagnosis times are the times for each individual component;
the other time values are cumulative from the lightweight monitoring triggering. After the time to ﬁrst VSEF, we can
begin spreading an antibody. Initial time is the time it takes to generate both VSEFs and isolate the exploit’s input;
total time includes the slicing step.
strcat), and then only when strcat is called by 0x804ee82
(in ftpBuild-TitleUrl). This results in a .93% drop in
throughput (91.6 Mbps vs. 92.5Mbps). Much of the over-
head comes from monitoring calls to malloc and free to get
the exact ranges of live buﬀers; if a second heap buﬀer over-
ﬂow was identiﬁed, the combined overhead would increase
less. In the worst case, overhead is linear with the num-
ber of vulnerabilities; systems running software with many
unpatched vulnerabilities which have wild exploits will ex-
perience higher overheads. Users who wish to avoid such
overhead should apply patches as they become available.
Again, the overheads are clearly suitable for production run
deployment.
Analysis Times Sweeper can generate VSEFs very quickly:
60 ms for Apache and 40 ms for Squid. As we show in Sec-
tion 6, fast antibody generation is important for dealing with
the fastest of worms; 60 ms is more than fast enough. Ta-
ble 3 shows the details of our analysis performance. For both
measured applications, the time to get the “best” VSEF was
under 15 seconds; in Squid’s case the initial result was the
best. The time to get the VSEFs and to isolate the input
responsible is under 40 seconds.
Although the complete analysis results are not available
immediately, the intermediate results (i.e., initial VSEFs)
are suﬃcient to use for antibodies because they do not have
false positives even though they may have a higher false
negatives. Waiting for the full analysis to complete is in-
advisable, because the further delay will allow a fast worm
to spread. Instead, antibodies should be distributed im-
mediately upon availability (e.g., within 60 ms). The ini-
tial VSEF is more than suﬃcient to stop the particular ex-
ploit being used (and will catch poly- and meta-morphic
variants); because it is available sooner, it is best for this
worm outbreak. The improved VSEF can be distributed as
a follow-on.
Recovery Once VSEFs are applied, we perform recovery.
Figure 5 shows the client-perceived throughput as a func-
tion of time. Approximately 24 seconds in, the throughput
drops due to recovery taking place; no requests complete
service during this time, and clients perceive increased la-
tency. Shortly thereafter, service resumes as normal. In con-
trast, a restart of Squid takes over 5 seconds, and clients per-
ceive dropped connections and refused connection attempts.
For more details about the recovery performance of Sweeper
please see our Rx paper [45].
6. COMMUNITYDEFENSEAGAINSTFAST-
SPREADING WORMS
As we have shown, Sweeper protects individual hosts even
from fast-spreading worm that exploits previously unknown 0
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Figure 5: Throughput during a single attack against
Squid
vulnerabilities, i.e., zero-day hit-list worms. The ﬁrst time
that such a worm tries to infect a Sweeper-protected host,
the exploit will be detected, analyzed, and one or more an-
tibodies deployed to prevent further attacks against that
vulnerability.
We next show how a Sweeper community can protect even
those who do not deploy Sweeper from new exploit attacks,
including fast-spreading worms. In this community, we call
those who deploy the complete Sweeper system Producers.
When a Producer detects a new attack and generates the
corresponding antibodies, it shares those antibodies with
Consumers, thus preventing them from becoming infected.
Given the low (> 5%) overhead involved in being a producer,
we would expect that the percentage of Producers to be
high; here we present Producer deployment ratios far below
our expectations.
The challenge is to generate antibodies and distribute
them to the Consumers before they are infected. We use
worm modeling techniques to show that most Consumers
can be protected from even the fastest observed worms. Fur-
ther, we show that if Consumers deploy light-weight proac-
tive defense mechanisms, we can protect most Consumers
from even hit-list worms.
6.1 Community Model
Worm propagation can be well described with the classic
Susceptible-Infected (SI) epidemic model [26]. Let β be the
average contact rate at which a compromised host contacts
vulnerable hosts to try to infect them, t be time, N the total
number of vulnerable hosts. Let I(t) represent the total
number of infected hosts at time t. Let α be the fraction
of vulnerable hosts which are Producers, and the remaining
vulnerable population (1 − α) be Consumers. Let P(t) be
the total number of producers contacted by at least one
infection attempt at time t.
From the SI model, we have:
dI(t)
dt
= βI(t)(1 − α − I(t)/N) (1)
dP(t)
dt
= αβI(t)(1 − P(t)/(αN)) (2)
We call the time at which at least one Producer has re-
ceived an infection attempt, and hence can begin gener-
ating and distributing antibodies, T0. By this deﬁnition,
P(T0) = 1. We can solve the above equation to ﬁnd T0.
Once a Producer is contacted with an infection attempt,
it takes time γ1 until the producer creates an antibody us-
ing exploit analysis, and then it takes time γ2 until the an-
tibody can be disseminated to Consumers (and if needed,
veriﬁed). Let γ = γ1 + γ2, and we call γ the response time
of the Sweeper community. Thus, after time T0 + γ, all the
vulnerable hosts have received and installed the antibody
and become immune to the worm outbreak. Thus, the total
number of infected hosts throughout the worm outbreak is
I(T0 + γ), and I(T0 + γ)/N is the infection ratio.
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Figure 6: Sweeper defense against Slammer (β = 0.1)
6.2 Protection Against Slammer
The fastest-spreading worm to date is Slammer. In the
Slammer worm outbreak, the contact rate β was 0.1, and
the number of vulnerable hosts N was approximately 100000
[12].
Figure 6 shows that a Sweeper community could have
prevented the Slammer worm from infecting most vulner-
able hosts, for a variety of producer ratios α and response
times γ. For example, given a very low deployment ratio
α = 0.0001, and a reasonable response time γ = 5 seconds,
the overall infection ratio is only 15%. For a slightly higher
producer ratio α = 0.001, the Sweeper community is even
more eﬀective, protecting all but 5% of the vulnerable hosts
even for a relatively slow response time of γ = 20 seconds.
6.3 Protection Against Hit-List Worms
A well designed worm could propagate much more quickly
than Slammer. In particular, a hit-list worm contains a hit-
list of vulnerable machines. Hit-list worms can spread up
to orders of magnitude more quickly because they need not
scan to ﬁnd vulnerable hosts [53, 54].
If Slammer had been designed as a hit-list worm, it may
have achieved a contact rate of β = 1000, or even β = 4000;
this is ten-thousand to forty-thousand times faster than ob-
served. In our model, this would result in 100% of vulnera-
ble hosts becoming infected in mere hundredths of a second.
Even if the very ﬁrst infection attempt was against a Pro-
ducer (i.e., T0 = 0), this does not provide enough time to
produce, distribute, and verify antibodies.
Proactive protection We can protect against even hit-
list worms if we combine our reactive strategy of producing
and distributing antibodies with a proactive strategy to slowdown the spread of the worm [8].
For example, for a large class of attacks, address space ran-
domization can provide probabilistic proactive protection.
The attack, with high probability, will crash the vulnera-
ble program instead of successfully compromising it. How-
ever, because the protection is only probabilistic, repeated
or brute-force attacks will succeed; the attacker will eventu-
ally “guess” the address space layout and successfully infect
the host.
Let ρ be the probability that a particular infection at-
tempt successfully exploits a host with probabilistic protec-
tion. We model the spread of a hit-list worm where vulner-
able hosts use proactive protection with:
dI(t)
dt
= βρI(t)(1 − α − I(t)/N) (3)
dP(t)
dt
= αβI(t)(1 − P(t)/(αN)) (4)
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Figure 7: Sweeper with proactive protection against
hit-list (β = 1000). Note that γ = 50 is much worse
than γ = 30.
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Figure 8: Sweeper with proactive protection against
hit-list (β = 4000). Note that γ = 20 is much worse
than γ = 10.
We show that Sweeper combined with proactive protec-
tion can protect against even hit-list worms with contact
rate β = 1000 in Figure 7, and with contact rate β = 4000
in Figure 8. Here, we set the probability that an infection
attempt succeeds to ρ = 2
−12, which many address random-
izations achieve [46]. We again use N = 100000 vulnerable
hosts. For example, the ﬁgures indicate that given deploy-
ment rate α = 0.0001 and reaction time γ = 10 seconds, the
overall infection ratio is only 5% for β = 1000 and 40% for
β = 4000. For α = 0.0001 and γ = 5 seconds, the overall
infection ratio is negligible (less than 1%) for both cases.
Note the large diﬀerences in infection ratio as γ increases:
for γ = 50 in the β = 1000 case and γ = 20 in the β = 4000
case the worm would still infect large fractions of all vulner-
able hosts. Hence, even with the proactive protection, we
do still require an automated defense such as Sweeper.
Our models show that a total end-to-end time (including
time for detection, analysis, and antibody dissemination/
deployment) of about 5 seconds will stop a hit-list worm.
Note that our experiments (Section 5.1) show that detection
and analysis are almost instantaneous, and the total time it
takes to create an eﬀective VSEF is well under 2 seconds.
Vigilante shows that the initial dissemination of an alert
could take less than 3 seconds [16]. Thus our system achieves
an γ = 2 + 3 = 5. By impeding the spread of the worm,
our system can eﬀectively defend against eﬀectively defend
against even hit-list worms which are thousands of times
faster than the fastest observed worm, even for low values
of α.
7. RELATED WORK
7.1 Checkpoint and Rollback
While Sweeper leverages a lightweight checkpoint and re-
execution support similar to FlashBack or Rx [45, 52], it
could use other checkpoint systems like the Time-traveling
Virtual Machines [28], or ReVirt [21]. ReVirt also deals in
a security setting: speciﬁcally, postmortem analysis. How-
ever, ReVirt is intended as an oﬄine forensic tool, and does
not target on-line systems.
7.2 Bug detection and analysis
Sweeper makes use of various bug detection techniques
both to detect the initial exploit attempt and to analyze the
exploit attempt after rollback. In general, the more useful
the analysis results, the more expensive the tool is to run,
and therefore less suitable for use as a lightweight detector.
Sweeper’s baseline bug detection method, address space
randomization [23], provides an almost free detection mech-
anism, however, it can be probabilistically bypassed [46].
This is only a minor concern in Sweeper, since for hosts
deploying the full system, capturing an attack once is suf-
ﬁcient. Slightly less lightweight monitors like SafeMem [44]
may also be used widely. Other monitors exist which trade
runtime overhead for greater protection. Those such as
StackGuard [17] or CCured [15, 36] require source code,
while Purify [25] or Valgrind [37] are applicable in the binary-
only case. Shadow honeypots [3] consider moving the attack
detectors to a separate machine or separate process in order
to allow better overhead management.
Dynamic taint analysis has been variously proposed and
used in [41, 19, 55, 16]. Taint analysis detects the usage
of data “tainted” by untrusted input in various dangerous
ways (for example, using the input as a return address).
Taint analysis is quite similar to dynamic slicing [61, 65],
but focuses on detecting exploit attempts rather than de-
bugging. Although taint analysis is a powerful technique todetect security exploits it tends to impose infeasibly high
overheads. A recent work in dynamic binary instrumenta-
tion, LIFT [43], reduces the overehad to potentially man-
ageable levels (2-4x); this may be deployable for a decent
fraction of hosts.
7.3 Attack Response
A considerable amount of research eﬀort [16, 27, 29, 41,
40, 50] has been devoted to automatically generating at-
tack signatures. Earlybird [50], Honeycomb [29] and Auto-
graph [27], share a common limitation: the signatures gen-
erated are single, contiguous strings. Real life attacks can
often evade such ﬁlters. To tackle such polymorphic worms,
techniques like Polygraph [40] generate signatures that con-
sist multiple disjoint content substrings. However, recent
work [39, 42] shows that such polymorphic signature gener-
ators can be mislead into generating bad signatures; specif-
ically higher false negative rates. Shield [60], Vigilante [16],
DACODA [18], and our own work [9], all attempt to work
around such problems by directly deriving signatures from
the underlying vulnerability.
There have been various approaches to repair buggy pro-
grams. Some techniques are applied before hand; for in-
stance CCured [15] retroﬁts memory bounds checking at the
source code level, while DieHard [4] applies whole-program
probabilistic memory safety through replication and library
interposition. Rx [45], DIRA [51], and STEM [49] make at-
tempts at repair post-hoc; Rx through environmental per-
turbations, DIRA by rollback & elimination of attack pack-
ets, and STEM through a reactive deployment scheme which
forcibly returns from a failing function. [33] modiﬁes STEM
by spreading the monitoring load out among all instances
of an application; such space-wise sampling will reduce per-
instance overhead at the expense of lower per-instance eﬀec-
tiveness. [48] also builds on STEM by applying source-code
transformations, including memory-safety transformations,
targeting the speciﬁc failing function. FLIPS [32] is a hybrid
approach which incorporates an anomaly-based classiﬁer, a
signature-based ﬁltering scheme, and a supervision frame-
work that employs instruction set randomization (through
STEM).
Vigilante [16] is a nice automatic worm defense similar
to Sweeper. A subset of nodes monitor their execution
with full dynamic taint analysis (or, nodes may sample re-
quests). When an exploit is detected, Vigilante creates a
self-verifying signature to distribute to all nodes. There are
several important technical diﬀerences between Sweeper and
Vigilante. First, Sweeper provides a recovery mechanism
through rollback and modiﬁed re-execution. Second, Vigi-
lante provides no means to combine light-weight and heavy-
weight detectors. Therefore, Vigilante either must sample
requests or be deployed only on a subset of honey-pot hosts.
Hosts which are sampling only have a small chance to ana-
lyze an exploit attempt, while honey-pot nodes are vulnera-
ble to being avoided. In combining light- and heavy-weight
detectors, Sweeper provides more ﬂexibility, can be more
widely deployed, and increases the number of exploit at-
tempts which will be monitored. Third, the two systems
generate and distributed diﬀerent sorts of antibodies. Fi-
nally, reactive antibody systems, like Vigilante, can not dis-
tribute their antibodies fast enough to deal with a hit-list
worm. The additional layer of defense that Sweeper provides
with its lightweight monitors provides suﬃcient robustness
to react against extremely fast hit-list worms.
A shortcoming of many techniques for detecting or re-
sponding to security attacks is the high overheads involved.
Vigilante [16] (and our own Section 6) discuss how both
a fast response and a wide-spread deployment are critical
to responding to fast worms. One desirable response is to
directly reduce the overhead (e.g. LIFT [43]); this is not
always possible. Another is to restrict one’s self to lower
overhead techniques despite potentially lower power. For
example, both Liang and Sekar [31] and Xu et. al. [64] inde-
pendently propose diﬀerent approaches to use address space
randomization, generating signatures from the resultant cor-
rupted post-crash memory state. However, this low over-
head comes at a cost. Liang and Sekar’s approach does not
work for programs where static binary analysis is diﬃcult,
and their signature generation does not work in many cases
(for example, if the inputs are processed or decoded prior
to causing a buﬀer overﬂow). The analysis in Xu et.al.’s
approach is also limited, and their signatures suﬀer from
similar problems as described in [18]. Additionally, these
approaches rely only on address space randomization, which
can be bypassed; our approach has the ﬂexibility to allow
various light- and heavy-weight detectors to be plugged in,
as per an individual host’s requirements.
A much more generally desirable method, as proposed
in [47], is to use low overhead techniques to decide when
greater expense is warranted. Selectively focusing heavy-
weight techniques to be performed only when needed reduces
overhead to the point that they are no longer truly “heavy-
weight” techniques. Sweeper similarly uses lightweight anal-
ysis to trigger rollback and heavyweight analysis. Further,
Sweeper performs such post-hoc analysis in situ by re-executing
the original exploit in the original environment. The resul-
tant analysis allows a lightweight, pin-point response to be
developed; this is beyond the power of lightweight analysis.
8. CONCLUSIONS
We presented an innovative approach for defending against
exploits. By leveraging checkpointing and replay, we al-
low continuous lightweight monitoring to be combined with
heavy-weight analysis. The resulting system has low over-
head (1%) during normal execution, which allows more wide-
spread deployment than similar systems. Further, the anal-
ysis is used to generate multiple forms of antibodies, which
are available starting at 60 ms from the signs of attack.
We demonstrated an implementation of our approach in
Sweeper. Against 4 real exploits in 3 diﬀerent server ap-
plications, Sweeper generates eﬀective antibodies quickly
(no slower than 60 ms). We also provide analytical results
demonstrating how eﬀective Sweeper would be against a fast
worm outbreak.
We are the ﬁrst to realize an architecture which protects
applications with lightweight techniques while enabling more
sophisticated techniques to perform accurate post-analysis.
We are also the ﬁrst to provide recovery against such attacks
without access to source code. Finally, ours is the ﬁrst imple-
mentation capable of generating sophisticated vulnerability-
speciﬁc execution ﬁlters while maintaining performance at
levels feasible for widespread deployment.
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